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PROGRESS OF THE LAW IN WASHINGTON
COMMIINITY PROPERTY*
III. MANNE

op ACQUISMON

Another means of overcoming the prima facie presumption that
all property acquired by either spouse during coverture is community property is afforded by the statutory provision making
all property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent the separate property of the spouse acquiring. Obviously, the only substantive problem which will arise in this connection is whether or
not the property in question was acquired by one of these methods.
So far as gifts inter vrvos are concerned, the only cases to come
before our court are those involving an alleged gift from one
spouse to the other. The principle that one spouse may transfer
his or her interest in items of community property to the other by
gift, thereby vesting in the transferee spouse complete ownership
of the property as separate property, subject only to the rights
of creditors, is firmly intrenched in the law.20 Where real property
is the subject matter of the transfer, the statute2 requires a deed
to be executed by the tranferor spouse to the transferee spouse,
and after In re Parker'sEstate22 it seems that no other method of
transferring a community interest in such property from one
spouse to the other would be recognized. However, this must not
be taken to mean that every deed of community real estate from
one spouse to the other necessarily has the effect of transforming
it into the separate property of the grantee. In re Carmack's
Estate22 the court said.
"We have held that, where a husband deeds his separate
property or his interest in community property to his
*Continued from last issue.
" Union Savzngs & Trust Co. v. Manney, 101 Wash. 274, 172 Pac. 251

(1918).

2 Pierce's Code, Sec. 1443.
2 115 Wash. 57, 196 Pac. 632 (1921). In Lansgan 'v. Miles, 102 Wash.
82, 172 Pac. 894 (1918), it was held that where the husband had the deed
from the vendor made to the wife as grantee and so conducted himself
with reference to the property as to evidence no claim or interest m it,
the deed could be given the same effect as between the spouses as a deed
directly from the husband to the wife so far as his community interest
was concerned. That principle is apparently rejected In re ParkersEstate.
21133 Wash. 374, 233 Pac. 942 (1925).
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wife, the full title is vested in the wife as her separate
property, unless the testimony is very clear and convincing that such was not the intention."
In this case it was held that the fact that the husband continued
to handle the property and received and retained the purchase
price when it was subsequently sold did not prove an intention
that the property, which he had deeded to his wife, should be
other than her separate property, but the language quoted clearly
establishes the possibility of showing that prop.erty so conveyed
nevertheless retains its status as community property if there was
no intention to transform it into separate property
Since our community property statutes contain no provisions
dealing with gifts of community personalty between the spouses
it is necessary for the court to resort to common law principles for
the purpose of determining whether or not a given state of facts
constitutes a gift of community interest from one spouse to the
other. 24 Consequently, any dealings with community personalty
which will satisfy the common law requirements for a valid gift
from one spouse to another will operate to vest complete ownership in the donee spouse as separate property Two recent cases
involve interesting applications of this rule.
In Jones v. Duke25 an automobile was purchased by W with
money accumulated in the following manner- Rl made W an allowance for household expenses, and a part of her savings from
this allowance were used in the purchase of the car, the remainder
consisted of income from rental of a room in the home. A controversy between a creditor of W and H required the court to
determine whether the car was her separate property or community property, and it was held to be the latter. In the absence
of additional facts that was the only result the court could reach
either on principle or authority The earnings of the spouses are,
under our statutes and decisions, practically the only source of
community property and if all such assets in excess of current
expenditures should be regarded as the separate property of the
spouse effecting the saving there would never be any community
property This was, in effect, the theory upon which it was held
in the early case of Abbott v. Wetherby 26 that such savings were
community property The home being community property, rentals
-In re Slocun.'s Estate, 83 Wash. 158, 145 Pac. 204 (1915). "In order
to constitute a gift of personal property, three things are necessary- (a)
an intention on the part of the donor to presently give; (b) a subjectmatter capable of passing by delivery, and (c) an actual delivery at the
time." Also see In re Hubbard's Estate, 115 Wash. 489, 197 Pac. 610
1921).
S151 Wash. 108, 275 Pac. 72 (1929).
2,6 Wash. 108, 275 Pac. 72 (1893).
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derived from it were clearly community property But there were
additional facts in the case. The money saved by W from these
two sources was deposited in her personal banking account with
the knowledge and consent of H, and was used by her at her
pleasure. After she purchased the car in question she registered
it in her own name, and it was entered as her personal property
on the assessment books of the county Upon these facts it was
urged that there was a gift to W of H's interest in the community
funds which were used in the purchase of the car and that the
car was, in consequence, W's separate property The court refused
to find a gift on these facts on the theory that there was no clear
and convincing evidence of a gift, which would be necessary to
overcome the presumption that it was community property 27
Merritt v. Newkark 2s presented the same problem of gift, but it
was raised on a very different group of facts. W purchased a
house and lot as her separate property for a consideration of
$1200, and it became the permanent home of H and W Over a
period of years improvements were made on the property and
taxes were paid by H out of community funds, totalling $3,200.
The value of the premises when the action was begun was estimated
at more than $3,500, and it was conceded that the improvements
represented a substantial part of that value. A judgment creditor
of the community, asserting that the community had an interest
in the property, sought to levy upon it, the court held that the
entire property was the separate property of W, denied that the
community had any interest in it, and decreed that title be quieted
SW29
In reaching this result, the court employed two lines of reasonmng- (1) That the status of property is to be determined as of
the date of its acquisition, and that the status of improvements
put upon property is to be determined by the status of the property
improved. (2) That in any event the facts disclosed a gift by
H to W of his interest in the community funds expended for the
improvements and taxes. The first line of reasoning would be
conclusive against the right of the creditor to take the property in
execution were it not for the fact that the court has, in other
cases, recognized a community interest in separate property
where a substantial sum of community funds has been used in
making valuable improvements thereon.3 0 The second line of reas27 Does this presumption require stronger evidence of gift than would
be necessary otherwise?
u"155 Wash. 517, 285 Pac. 442 (1930).
"The facts are not fully set forth in the opinion. For a more complete statement see briefs of counsel on appeal.
"W T. Rawleigh Co. v. McLeod, 151 Wash. 221, 275 Pac. 700 (1929),
and cases cited therein.
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oing avoids a possible conflict with the doctrine of those cases,
and if the court's conclusion that there was a gift by H to W
is supported by the evidence the decision is invulnerable.
It is submitted that there are two tenable objections to the
conclusion of gift in this case. (1) Since alleged gifts of personalty inter spouses, as has heretofore been pointed out, must be
tested by the common law requirements for a valid gift of personalty it follows that the evidence adduced should establish the
intent of the donor to make a gift, plus a delivery to or for the
donee, to justify a finding of gift."1 Neither of these essentials
are even mentioned in the court's opinion and they are not so
apparent upon the facts as to make discussion of them unnecessary,
on the contrary, it seems doubtful if there was proof of intent
and delivery (2) The finding of gift here can hardly be reconciled with the refusal to find a gift in Jones v. Duke.
There are facts disclosed by the findings of the trial court
which could, perhaps, serve to establish a delivery from H to W, H
did pay over the community funds, the subject matter of the gift,
and requested and received a benefit to the separate property of
W in return, which property was at all times legally possessed
and controlled by W However, the chief difficulty is not in finding evidence which would establish delivery, but in finding evidence which would establish the intent to make a gift, for there
seems to be no more independent evidence of an intent on the
part of H to make a gift to W in this case than there was in
Jones v. Duke and very little more from which such an intent
might be inferred. To conclude that there was a gift in Merritt
v. Newksrk and to hold that the entire property was therefore
the separate property of W seems hardly consistent with the rule
requiring clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that everything acquired during coverture is community
Andrews v. Andrews3 2 and Young v. O'Donne13 3 are the only
cases in which acquisitions by devise as distinguished from those
by purchase have been considered. In the first of these it was
alleged by E that he had made an oral contract with his father
by which he (H) agreed to support and care for his father for
the rest of his life, in consideration of which the father promised
to will certain property to H, and in an action against the estate
of the father and the heirs to enforce the contract against the
property, W was offered as a witness to prove the contract, but
her testimony was objected to on the ground that she was a party
"Note

24, supra.
Wash. 513, 119 Pac. 981 (1921)
1 129 Wash. 219, 224 Pac. 682 (1924).
12116
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interest since it was claimed the property when and if acquired would be community property if acquired by devise from
the father in pursuance of his promise to H, and that since the
purpose of the action to enforce the contract was to place H in as
nearly as possible the same position as if it had been performed,
the property acquired under a decree specifically enforcing it
would likewise be community property Therefore the testimony
of W was properly rejected. The court said.
in

"The main question is, was the property sought to be
obtained by this suit acquired by 'gift, bequest, devise or
descent,' within the spirit of the statute?
"We are satisfied that it would not have been so acquired. It would have been acquired by contract. There
is no element of gift, bequest or devise involved in this
case. Joshua Andrews, according to the alleged agreement, was to will his property to his son for a consideration, and that consideration was that the latter was to
maintain and support him during the remainder of his
life, or such portion thereof as he might elect to accept
such maintenance and support. The testimony was that
the services to be performed in payment of the property
to be acquired were performed by the appellant and his
wife. It was their community property which housed and
sheltered Joshua Andrews, it was the community money
of the appellant and his wife which furnished, and was to
furnish, the table from which Mr. Andrews, senior, was
to eat. The testimony shows that the appellant's wife did
the housework and cooked the food, and did the other
usual duties in the maintenance of the home, 'and in the
care and attention given to Mr. Andrews, senior. Everything that went into his maintenance was the joint effort
of the appellant and his wife. In no true sense was the
appellant to acquire this property by gift. He was to
acquire it by virtue of a contract which was to be performed on the one side by himself and his wife. Bouvier's
Law Dictionary defines 'Gift' as a 'voluntary conveyance
or transfer of property, that is, one not founded on the
consideration of money or love. A voluntary, immediate,
absolute transfer of property without consideration.' The
'gift, bequest, devise or descent' contemplated by the statute as constituting separate property is not based upon
contract or consideration, and property willed by one to
another in compliance with a contract between the parties
is not a gift or bequest in contemplation of the statute.
If the appellant had alleged and shown that the contract
was a personal one between his father and himself and
was to be performed, and was performed, by means of
his separate property and his individual endeavors, then
the property to have been acquired might have been his
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separate property, and his wife might have testified as
to the terms of the contract. But this situation is not
before us and we do not decide it. But, even in that
instance, it would be his separate property by purchase,
and it would not have been his by gift, devise or descent
within the spirit of the statute. If the alleged contract
had been made by the appellant with a stranger and not
with his blood relation, then it would seem to us that
everyone must say that the property to be acquired under
it would be community property, because we have always
held that property acquired by the joint efforts of the
husband and wife is presumed to be community property
The mere fact that it is alleged that the contract here was
made with the appellant's father could not change the
legal situation, and the legal effect must be the same as
if the contract had been made with entire strangers."
In Young v. O'Donnell the father deeded land to his son, H,
in consideration of H1's promise to care for him until his death.
The deed provided that it was to take effect only upon the death
of the father, that he reserved absolute dominion and control
during his life, and that it should be null and void if H died
first. H then conveyed the land to his sister, W not joining in
the deed. Upon the death of the father both H and the sister
claimed title to the land. The court held that the title to the
land was vested in the sister for two reasons (1) it was said
that the deed to H was not a conveyance inter vivos but a testamentary disposition and so necessarily ambulatory, and therefore
since the father had subsequently deeded the land to the sister
the testamentary disposition to H was revoked and title thereupon passed from the father (in whom it had remained all along)
to the sister, and (2) it was also said with reference to the deed
from the father to H "that whatever title or interest it conveyed
to the grantee was by way of either gift or devise, and conveyed
no interest therein as the property of the community," from
which it was concluded that the conveyance from H to his sister
would have operated to vest title in the sister, assuming that H
took a title 'byreason of the deed from the father.
It is apparent that the reasoning in these cases cannot be completely reconciled, although the result in each case may be supported. The vital point of difference between th- cases is this
by the reasoning in Andrews v. Andrews the status of property
acquired by either of the spouses by devise is to be determined by
ascertaining the function of the devise, whereas by the second
line of reasoning in Young v. O'Donnell the status of such property is to be conclusively determined by the character of the dispositive instrument. Since the latter case did not purport to
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overrule the former in this respect, and also because the second
line of reasoning was not necessary to support the result reached,
it is impossible to estimate its effect upon the authority of the
Andrews case. So far as the merits of the cases are concerned,
however, the advantage is all with the reasoning of the Andrews
case. It is incredible that the legislature intended that the final
act, consummating a transaction, should conclusively determine
the legal character of the transaction. In determining how property is acquired it is the general policy of the law to look at the
entire acquisitive transaction, otherwise there is no assurance that
the community will receive the benefits of its contribution toward
the acquisition. Suppose H transfers community funds to X, in
consideration of which X promises to devise land to H, if X
performs his promise (which was legally binding upon him) and
devises the land to H, upon what principle or policy of the community property law can it be said that the land becomes the
separate property of H9
IV

SouncE oF AcQUISITION

"Under our somewhat perplexing statutes relating to the acquisition of property, title to real property taken in the name
of one of the spouses may be the separate property of the spouse
taking the title, the separate property of the other spouse, or
the community property of both of the spouses, owing to the
source from which the fund is derived which is used in paying
the purchase price of the property If the fund is derived from
the separate property of one of the spouses, the property purchased is the separate property of that spouse, if it is derived
from the community property of both the spouses, it is the community property of both of them." 3 4 This is likewise the rule
where personal property is acquired during coverture.35 The basis
of this principle is expressed in those sections of our community
property statutes which define separate property as that acquired
before marriage, or afterwards by gift, bequest, devise or descent,
witli the rents, ssuses, and profits thereof, since acquisitions of
property by means of separate funds or property may fairly be
regarded as the "issues" of separate property Any other rule
would be totally inconsistent with the fundamental concept of
community property as the product of community enterprise.
Pursuant to this rule it is uniformly held that property acquired
during coverture, although presumptively community property,
may nevertheless be shown to be the separate property of the hus"Merritt v. Newicrk, note 28, supra.
Smith v. Wee, 75 Wash. 452, 134 Pac. 1070 (1913)
Severyns d Co., 159 Wash. 486, 293 Pac. 458 (1930).

Hearron v. John
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band or wife (or perhaps of both) by clear and convincing evidence that the property was acquired in exchange for or by means
of separate property
In applying the rule it has been decided that credit may be
regarded as "property" and that property purchased on credit
takes its status as separate or community from the character of
the credit employed in its acquisition, if separate credit (that
is, if the obligation created is enforcible only against the separate
estate of the spouses) the property is separate, if community
credit, the property is community 80 Money borrowed or property
purchased by the wife upon credit was originally held to be community property irrespective of the character of the credit extended," but in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lees 8
that view was practically abandoned and the court swung over
to the rule prevailing in other jurisdictions, by which acqmsitions upon the separate credit of the wife result in separate
property The fact that the wife had sufficient separate funds
to meet the obligation created by the extension of credit to her
was emphasized by the court, and it was thought that this would
distinguish it from the earlier cases holding the property acquired
to be community 39 Such a distinction, however, seems untenable
and has not been strongly re-emphasized by the court m later
cases. The wife has no general authority to borrow or purchase
upon community credit without an authorization from the husband, and although authorized by the husband it is always a question whether or not in her dealings with the creditor she actually
utilized the community credit as well as or instead of her own.
Insufficiency of separate funds to meet the obligation when incurred may be of some probative value in establishing that community credit was used where she was authorized to pledge community credit, but it is not conclusive as to what credit was
actually pledged.
Following the lead taken by United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Lee it was decided in Graves v. Columbia Underwriters0
A purchase upon credit is a form of exchange. If the property purchased is tangible, as land or goods, there is an exchange of tangible for
intangible property, the chose in action which the vendor receives being
the credit of the vendee.
3tHerntz v. Brown, 46 Wash. 387, 90 Pac. 211 (1908), and cases cited
therein.
58 Wash. 16, 107 Pac. 870 (1910).
31"In the case at bar the appellant borrowed no money. Her separate
estate was amply sufficient to meet the whole contract at the time it
was entered into. She was not required to create a community obligation,
and did not intend to do so. She entered into a contract which her
separate estate was sufficient to protect, and which she partly performed
with separate funds, and without doubt intended to carry out as her
separate contract without community liability. In these respects this
case is distinguishable from Heintz v. Brown, supra."
40

93 Wash. 196, 160 Pac. 436 (1916)
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that even where the husband jomed with the wife in the execution of a note and a mortgage upon the wife's separate property
securing the same it might be shown that only the separate credit
of the wife was actually pledged and that property acquired
thereby became her separate property That rule was again recognized and applied In re Finn's Estate4' in which the husband not
only joined in the note and mortgage but also paid the obligation with community funds. These decisions must be regarded
as definitely establishing the following principles. (1) acquisitions upon the separate credit of the wife are separate property
of the wife, and (2) the presumption that such property is community may be overcome and the property shown to be
separate
by proof that only the wife's separate credit was actually pledged
irrespective of the form of the transaction and the character of
funds used in satisfying the obligation.
In In re Browm's Estate42 these principles were apparently extended to include acquisitions by the husband upon his separate
credit, and that decision may be supported as a necessary corrollary to the recognition of separate acquisitions upon the separate
credit of the wife. There is no reason for denying the husband
the privilege of making acquisitions upon his separate credit and
if he does so the property acquired should be his separate property
upon the authority of the "source" doctrine summarized in Merritt v. Newkurk.4 s
Against this background it is proposed to examine three cases,
decided within the ten year period, dealing with acquisitions of
real estate by one of the spouses, in which the purchase money
note and mortgage was employed as a credit device. Riverside
Finance Co. v. Grffith74 was the first of these. In that case H
owned a considerable amount of separate property at the time of
his marriage. Subsequently he purchased a tract of land, making
an initial payment out of separate funds, and executing to the
vendor a promissory note representing the balance of. the purchase price and a mortgage upon the land securing the same, in
both of which W joined as a maker. The note was ultimately paid
by H from separate funds, and from the evidence it was found
that as between the vendor and H only the separate credit of
H was actually pledged in the transaction, W being required to
join by the vendor as a matter of form to insure against any
possible objections upon her part to the foreclosure of the mortgage should such action become necessary Upon these facts it
"106 Wash. 137, 179 Pac. 103 (1919).
'0124 Wash. 273, 214 Pac. 10 (1923).
,ONote 28, supra.
"140 Wash. 322, 248 Pac. 786 (1926).
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was held that the presumption had been rebutted and that the
land was the separate property of H. The court emphasized the
fact that the community, as such, actually contributed nothing to
its acquisition.45
The next case was In re Parker's Estate.46 W purchased land,
making the initial payment from separate funds and giving a
purchase money note and mortgage to the vendor for the balance,
in which H joined as a maker. The note was paid by W from
separate funds but there was no evidence to show the character
of the obligation incurred and credit pledged as between W and
the vendor. The court held that it was a community obligation
and in that proportion the land was community property, relying upon Katterhagen v. Mester and Rawlings v. Heal.47 In a
dissenting opinion Justice Holcomb, who wrote the opinion in
Riverside Finance Co. v. Griffith, said
"Upon the principal appeal, I cannot view the facts,
and, consequently the applicable law, as do the majority
"The facts here seem to me to overthrow the presumption as to the property being community There is no
evidence that the community furnished any part of the
consideration paid for the two properties, or that they
were purchased on the credit of the community, even
though notes and mortgages were given, as mere expedients, as in Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340, 115 Pac. 731, 37
L.R.A. (N.S.) 186, Chapman v. Edwards, 113 Wash. 224,
193 Pac. 712, Dart v. McDonald, 114 Wash. 448, 195 Pac.
253, or merely perfunctorily, as in Rsverside Finance Co.
v. Griffith, 140 Wash. 322, 248 Pac. 786, or compulsorily,
as in In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 Pac. 103.
"In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lee,
58 Wash. 16, 107 Pac. 870, a married woman bought real
"No other deduction can be made from the testimony of appellant,
the wife, than that all this property was acquired from the proceeds of
property through several transitions and gains that the husband acquired
from the sale of his former business, which was incontrovertibly separate property. These proceeds and the gains thereof were clearly traceable
from the transactions testified to by the wife. Nor does the circumstance
that, in purchasing the most valuable piece of property acquired by the
husband after the sale of his business, a mortgage was given signed by
both himself and his wife to the vendor for a portion of the purchase
price render the property community property. It is well known that
vendors, when dealing with purchasers who are married at the time,
generally require both spouses to join in the conveyances and incumbrances for safety, by estopping the other spouse from afterwards attacking the transactions.
"The record is clear that the husband's separate funds purchased these
properties, notwithstanding the fact that the mortgage was executed
by both the husband and the wife. The community, as such, contributed
nothing to its acquisition."
'153 Wash. 392, 279 Pac. 599 (1929).
"111 Wash. 218, 190 Pac. 237 (1920), in which Katterhagen v. Meister
is reviewed.
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estate, having separate funds and more receivable subsequently, made a contract of sale of the real estate, in
which it was demanded that her husband join, to which
she objected, but ultimately such joint contract was executed, and this court said.
" 'She did not desire to pay cash, and credit was extended for her accommodation.
The appellant, however, had money available sufficient to make the payments,
and intended to do so out of her separate funds without
assistance from her husband,'
"just as was intended and was done in this case. And
in that case, we held the real estate to have been the separate property of the wife, even in the face of a creditor's
attack."
Walker v. Fowler 8 was decided six months later. The material
facts were substantially the same as those in In re Parker'sEstate
except that in appellant's brief upon appeal it was stated that H
was required to join in the execution of the note and mortgage
merely as a matter of form and not for the purpose of involving
community credit, and as this was neither denied by respondents
nor refuted by the court, it is assumed to be a fact. Citing In re
Parker's Estate and the cases there relied upon, and expressly
overruling Riverside Finance Co. v. Griffith, the court held the
land to be community property to the extent of the credit represented by the note and mortgage. Justice Holcomb again dissented, particularly from the action of the majority in overruling
the Riverside case, apparently on the ground that it was distinguishable from the principle case. 49
To what extent are these eases consistent with the "source"
"155 Wash. 631, 285 Pac. 649 (1930)
" "I especially dissent from that part of the prevailingopinionwhich unnecessarily goes out of its way to overrule the decision in Riverside Finance
Co. v. Griffith, 140 Wash. 322, 248 Pac. 786. The decision in that case was
supported by five prior cases cited therein. In at least four of the five
cases cited therein, other prior cases were mentioned as supporting them.
Several of the majority signing the prevailing opinion concurred with
Judge Mackintosh in In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 Pac. 103, and
In re Brown's Estate, 124 Wash. 273, 214 Pac. 10, wherein the other cases
are discussed. The decision in the Mezster case, relied upon by the majority, was not in the way of the decision in the Finn case, where we
held that, where property was purchased and partly paid for by a wife
with separate funds and the balance secured by a joint note and mortgage upon her separate property, its status as her separate property is
fixed at that time and the presumption that It was community property
is overcome, although subsequently community funds were used in paying the obligation where there was no intention as between husband
and wife to change the original status of the property. The foregoing

principle announced in the Finn case was mentioned without disap-

proval in the case relied upon so much by the majority, the Rawlings case,
supra. There is no more necessity for overruling the Riverside Finance
Co. case, supra, than there is for overruling all the cases therein cited
and prior decisions cited in In re Finn's Estate and In re Brown's Estate,
supra."
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doctrine and with the considerations of policy upon which it is
founded?1° Should the execution of a purchase money note and
mortgage by husband and wife conclusively establish a community
interest in the property to the extent of the obligation so created?
In considering these questions certain propositions of law which
have become incontrovertible by frequent application must be
kept clearly in mind (1) all contractual obligations created by
a husband are prima facie community obligations, and the burden
is upon the one alleging such obligation to be a separate one to
establish that fact.". (2) Under the source doctrine, obligations are
treated as property and land acquired by means of a community
obligation is community property 52 (3) An obligation of the husband or the wife may involve only separate credit, and it would seem
to follow that an obligation of the husband and wife may also
involve only their separate credit, and not that of the community,
if such was the agreement with the creditor. s (4) Between the
original parties and their heirs or legal representatives an agreement as to the character of the obligation created may always be
shown, and under our decisions, perhaps the same is true even
5 4
where third persons are involved.
Testing the facts of Rsverstde Finance Co. v. Griffith by these
principles, the decision arrived at in that ease hardly seems open
to criticism. No reason is apparent why the property should have
been classified as community, in fact, the conclusion of the court
that the property was separate is the only one that can be rationalized with the source doctrine and the policy of allotting to the
community only that property in the acquisition of which the community contributed some value. Prima facie the note signed by
H and W was a community obligation and the property acquired
thereby was community property, but the presumption was entirely overcome when it was shown that at all times the parties
regarded the purchase as a separate transaction of H, and that

S It is submitted that the policy underlying the source doctrine is (1)
to assure the community of the benefits of community contribution to
acquisitions of property, and (2) to preserve to the separate estates of
the spouses the value of their contributions to acquisitions of property.
The principal difficulty is in determining which of these estates was the
true source of acquisition.
1 Oregon Improvemnent Go. v. Sagmesster, 4 Wash. 710, 30 Pac. 1058
(1892) Johns v. Clother 78 Wash. 602, 139 Pac. 755 (1914) Merritt v.
Newkirk, note 28, supra.
53Merritt v. Newlcksrk, note 28, supra.
14This result was reached in Katz v. Judd, 108 Wash. 557, 185 Pac.
613 (1919). H and W were held to be jointly and severally liable upon
a promissory note signed by both, but it was also held that no judgment
could be given against the community because it was the understanding
of the parties that no community credit was involved.
6McDonough v. Oraig, 10 Wash. 239, 38 Pac. 1034 (1894)
Peterson v.
Zimerman, 142 Wash. 385, 253 Pac. 642 (1927).
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they dealt upon that basis. Conceding that under our decisions
W could not escape personal liability upon the note as a maker
thereof,55 it does not follow that the obligation is enforcible against
the community, particularly if the debtor and creditor have agreed
that it shall not be a community obligation. An agent authorized
to create an obligation for his principal does not necessarily bind
Ins principal by creating such an obligation-neither does H necessarily bind the community merely because he could have done
so." If it is once satisfactorily shown that community credit was
not involved in the transaction, upon what principle may it be
said that the note is a community obligation or that the property
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is community property
The decision in In re Parker'sEstate is likewise consistent with
the principles enumerated above. In the dissenting opinion of
Justice Holcomb it is stated that "there is no evidence that the
community furnished any part of the consideration paid for the
properties, or that they were purchased on the credit of the community," but so far as the writer has been able to determine from
an examination of the court's opinion and the briefs of counsel,
there was no evidence that community credit was not involved.
Therefore the presumption was not overcome, the obligation represented by the note was in law a community obligation, and the
land was, upon the source theory, community property
Walker v. Fowler is an exceedingly difficult decision to evaluate,
due to the generality of the argument indulged in by the majority
and the paucity of statement concerning the facts as found by
the trial court and the specific evidence adduced at the trial bearmg upon the character of the obligation. If the recital in appellant's brief that it was understood between vendor and vendee
that no community obligation was created by H's joinder in the
execution of the note is assumed to be a fact then the decision can
hardly be approved. Upon that state of facts the decision is a
direct denial of the source doctrine, and in effect a ruling that
the joinder of H and W in the execution of a note conclusively
establishes it as a community obligation. The fallacy of this view
has already been pointed out.
In support of its judgment the majority relied upon In re
Parker's Estate, Rawlings v. Heal, and Katterhagen v. Messt r
' Katz v. Judd, note 53, supra.
u If a third person, knowing all the facts, elects to deal with the agent
rather than the principal, and extends credit only to the agent, the principal cannot be held upon the obligation. The result should be the same
where a third person, dealing with husband and wife and aware of all
the facts, agrees to deal with them and exclude the community.
" In this situation (1) the community is not a party to the transaction, (2) it contributes nothing to the acquisition, (3) it has no interest
in the transaction to be protected.
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But there is nothing to be found in the opinions in those cases
to indicate that the presumption of community obligation was
rebutted-nothing to indicate that the vendor understood that
community credit was not involved. In the last two cases the
court relied strongly upon United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
v. Lee, quoting the following statement from the opinion. "where
property is acquired during marriage, the test of its separate or
community character is whether it was acquired by community
funds and community credit, or separate funds and the issues
and profits thereof, the presumption always being that it is community property, but this presumption may be rebutted by
proof." This language, however, does not infer that an obligation
signed by both husband and wife is conclusively decreed to be a
community obligation, on the contrary it suggests that the separate character of the obligation is open to proof, and that is the
interpretation of it indulged in by the court in Rawlings v. Heal,
where, in discussing Finn v. Finn, it was said
"An apparent exception to the latter part of this rule,
as is pointed out in Finnv. Finn, 106 Wash. 137, 179 Pac.
103, arises when the spouse who furnishes the separate
consideration for the purchase raises or secures the remainder of the purchase price by a mortgage upon separate property theretofore owned by such spouse, thus
clearly making the debt a separate one, even though the
other spouse may be required to join in the note and
mortgage to satisfy the lender."
III.
POWERS OF DISPOSITION
I. REAL PROPERTY

Neither the husband nor the wife is given a sole power of disposition of community real property in Washington, the statute
requiring their joinder in the dispositive act.5 As to personal
property, however, the husband is the statutory agent of the community possessing the exclusive power of disposition within the
scope of his authority, except in a few extraordinary instances
where the wife is accorded a concurrent power of disposition.5 9
Applying these principles, it was held, in Anderson v. Natwnal
Bank of Tacoma,0 that an assignment by H of overdue rentals
on community real estate was binding upon W despite her nonjoinder. The court very properly said that the overdue rentals
were a chose in action and personal property of which H had the
exclusive power of disposition. Had they stopped there the case
asPierce's Code, Sec. 1434.
5 Pierce's Code, Sec. 1433. See McAlpine v. Kohler & Chase, 96 Wash.
146, 164 Pac. 755 (1917).
146 Wash. 520, 264 Pac. 8 (1928)
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would be of relatively little significance-but they added, by way
of dictum, that even where the community held a lease upon real
property it could be assigned by the husband alone, reaffirming
earlier cases so holding. 1
Those cases were decided upon the theory that a lease is a
chattel real partaking of the nature of personal property, and there
can be no doubt that such was the traditional concept of a leasehold interest at common law That concept was observed irrespective of the term of the lease-whether for one year, one
hundred, or one thousand. It is nevertheless interesting to speculate as to what our court would say of an assignment of a ninetynine year community lease, one year after its execution, by a
husband over the protest of his wife. Would the court sanction
that assignment and hold invalid an attempted conveyance of a
life estate by the husband made without the joinder of the wife ?
So long as the traditional classification of leaseholds is observed
the answer is almost certain to be in the affirmative, despite the
apparent inconsistency from a practical point of view

II. PERSONAL PROPERTY
While the husband has a very broad and general power of disposition over community personal property, it is subject to some
limitations in favor of the wife. Marston v. RUe6 2 is the leading case
delimiting the husband's power of disposition, and although it is
not possible to say with exactness just what all the fair implications of that decision are, at least this much was definitely decided. (1) that the husband may not dispose of community personalty in fraud of the wife, (2) and he may not make a valid
disposition of it in excess of the authority conferred upon him by
the statute, fraud or no fraud, and that authority is confined to
dispositions made in the interest of the community Upon the
authority of that case, a gift of $2,000 of community funds by H
to his sister, without the consent of W, was held invalid in Parker
v. Parker 8
Three years later the case of Stevens v. Naches State Bank
came before the court involving this problem.
"The real question, then, is whether the husband, who,
under the statute, has the control and right of disposition
of community personal property, and who, under our decisions, must exercise that control for and on behalf of
the community only (Sehramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309,
166 Pac. 634), may, in effect, give community personal
Tibbals 'v. 11fand, 10 Wash. 451, 39 Pac. 102 (1895) American Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Mafridge, 60 Wash. 180, 110 Pac. 1015 (1910).
n92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916).
0121 Wash. 24, 207 Pac. 1062 (1922).
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property to a son of the spouses by conveying or delivering it as security for the son's debt, upon which also
the husband is liable as a surety for the son." 4
The gift was upheld for two reasons. First, it was said that the
law would imply a consent by W in the absence of evidence of
dissent, because of the intimate relationship between herself and
the donee, second, that it was in the interest of the community to
make this gift to the child and that H had authority to make the
gift without the consent of W Parker v. Parker was distinguished
on the ground that neither spouse was under any obligation to
assist the sister, who had other means of her own. In that connection the court also said "While it is not so stated in the
opinion, it still is possible that had it appeared that the community estate was not exhausted or seriously impaired by the
gift, and that the sister was in need and that her brother (the
husband who made the gift) was the person to whom she would
naturally turn for assistance, the gift might have been sustained."
Both the decision in this case and the suggested modification of
the rule announced in Parker v. Parker appear to be consistent
with the principles laid down in Marston v. Rue. In determining
whether or not the husband has made a disposition in the interest
of the community, the pecuniary element is not the only consideration. Even though neither of the spouses nor the community
is under any obligation, legal or otherwise, to the recipient of
community funds-as in the case of a gift to charity-it seems
desirable to recognize that, within reasonable limits, the husband
is authorized to gratuitously dispose of community personalty
without the consent of the wife, since the occasional making of
gifts is one of the normal activities of a family Where there is
present the added fact of close family relationship between the
donor and donee there is all the more reason for conceding such
an authority
IV
LIABILITY FOR DEBTS
I.

COmmuNiTY LIABiLITY

For one reason or another it has become the settled law in
Washington, contrary to that obtaining in other community property jurisdictions, that community property can be taken only in
satisfaction of community obligations. The husband's separate
estate is the only res for the satisfaction of his separate obligations.6 5 This situation, requiring the courts to continually dis"1136 Wash. 137, 238 Pac. 918 (1925). This case was overruled in Sun
Lsfe Assurance Co. of Canada v. Outler 72 Wash. Dec. 408, 20 Pac. (2d)
1110 (1933), reported since this article went to press.
Snyder v. Strnger 116 Wash. 131, 198 Pac. 733
State Bank v. Tilton, 132 Wash. 641, 233 Pac. 15 (1925).

(1921)

Spokane
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tingush between community and separate obligations, has been
a prolific source of difficutly To assist in the solution of these
cases the court has again set up a prima facie presumption that
all obligations created by the husband are community obligations. If the presumption is rebutted by evidence tending to prove
that the obligation was separate and it becomes necessary to determine the matter on its merits, the test of its community character
is said to be whether or not it was incurred for the benefit of the
community 66 That the obligation is incurred "for the benefit of"
the community when the husband is acting to further or protect
some legitimate community interest (which appears to be the
equivalent of saying that he was acting within the scope of his
authority as agent for the community), and that profit or gain
in the transaction is not essential to community liability is also
67
well settled.
In Marquette v. Narhazl Bank of Ellensburg"8 and Peterson v.
Zimmerman5 a new element was injected into this situation. The
cases present this problem. To what extent, if at all, will the husband and wife be permitted to show, against parties other than
the original creditor, the separate character of the obligation sued
upon, for the purpose of avoiding community liability 9 Both cases
hold that it might be shown against a holder in due course of a
negotiable promissory note given by a husband for his separate
purposes. The court reasoned that since the note was signed by
the husband alone, the community could not be regarded as a
maker of the instrument, and that there was merely a prima facie
presumption that it was a community obligation, the rebuttle of
which did not affect the position of the holder with reference to
the parties whose signatures actually appeared on the instrument,
and against whom the holder is protected by statute from the
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defense that the signature was given as an accommodation.
Milne v. Kane, 64 Wash. 254, 116 Pac. 659 (1911) Longenhiser v.
Peck, 89 Wash. 435, 154 Pac. 814 (1916).
"Wazy v. Lyjru Theatre Co., 79 Wash. 275, 140 Pac. 320 (1914) Hennsng v. Anderson, 121 Wash. 53, 207 Pac. 1048 (1922).
3132 Wash. 181, 231 Pac. 788 (1925).
1'142Wash. 385, 253 Pac. 642 (1927).
o "But appellant urges that, since by Rem. Comp. Stat., See. 3415
(P. C., Sec. 4095), every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to
have been Issued for a valuable consideration, and every person whose
signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value, the
maker thereof cannot show that it was signed as an accommodation
party when it has passed into the hands of a third party in due course
for value. This may be true, so far as the signer is concerned, for he
cannot escape liability by showing that he is an accommodation maker.
But when the holder seeks to hold the community which.is not a signer
of the note, there is no statutory provision that intervenes against the
community. There is, of course, a presumption that the note was executed
for the community, but this presumption is rebuttable by proof."
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In support of this rule it may be said that it affords the wife a
greater degree of protection, insofar as her interest in the community estate is concerned, than she would otherwise enjoy, indeed, that is the only justification for the more fundamental rule
exempting community property from liability for the husband's
separate obligations, without which the problem in these cases
could never arise. The principal ground for objection to the rule
is that it greatly impairs the free transferability of negotiable
instruments in commercial transactions because of the necessity
for investigating the collateral circumstances attending the execution of the instrument for the purpose of determimng the character of the obligation and its consequent worth as a credit risk.
This objection was noted and passed over without discussion. It
is nevertheless a consideration of prime importance, for the desirability of the rule must be arrived at by a choice between these
conflicting interests.
As a practical matter it may be doubted whether or not the
application of this rule does seriously hamper freedom of negotiation. Probably the great majority of negotiable instruments
issued by husbands are, under the liberal construction of our court,
really community obligations. At least the purchaser of such an
instrument can rest assured that he is getting the separate obligation of the husband and compute the discount on that basis. If
it turns out to be a community obligation his position is just that
much improved and he gets more than he estimated. That method
of discounting notes signed by the husband alone would not make
it impossible to utilize community credit. A note signed by both
husband and wife, reciting on its face that it is a community obligation would certainly estopp them from denying the recital, at
least in the hands of a holder in due course. But it would also
result in liability of the wife's separate estate in the hands of
such a holder, which would be as objectionable from her point
of view as holding the community assets liable for the husband's
separate debt.
On the other side, it is also open to doubt whether or not the
wife would be materially prejudiced if she did not receive the
added protection which this rule provides for her. She does not
receive that protection in any of the other community property
jurisdictions and it seems unreasonable to assume that they would
permit such a state of affairs to continue if her interests are being
seriously affected.
II. PEs~owAL LABmITy
The separate estate of the husband is always liable for community obligations, but that of the wife cannot generally be
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taken in satisfaction of the debt. The liability of the husband's
separate estate is apparently based upon a check-rem theorythat since the husband is the one authorized to recur community
obligations it is a good practice to involve his personal estate as
a means of munmmimg reckless pledging of community credit.
This reasoning does not apply to the wife. However, by statute
her personal estate is made liable for family expenses and she may
be sued jointly with the husband and the community or separately
as the creditor elects. This has been construed as a joint and
several liability m every respect. In Hoddad v. ChapW7 ' it was held
that a payment on a debt for family expenses made by the husband
after the statute of limitations had run would not toll the statute
as to the wife unless she authorized the payment. That result is
entirely consistent with the purpose of the statute. No authority
for the husband to bind the separate estate of the wife can be
inferred by reason of his authority to contract a debt which will
become a charge upon her estate. Authority to create an obligation binding her estate is contemplated by the statute, authority
to revive that liability once barred by the statute of limitations
is not conferred.
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